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S E C R E T AMMAN 006686

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [KPKO](#) [HA](#) [JO](#) [UNSC](#)

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: PERFORMANCE OF JORDAN'S
CONTINGENT IN HAITI

REF: STATE 143382

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. This is an action request. Please see paragraph 7.

[1](#)2. (S) Summary. Defense Attache met August 16 with senior Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) officials to deliver reftel demarche regarding Jordan's battalion in Haiti. The Jordanians admitted leadership failures and identified key areas of improved training to address our concerns. End Summary.

[1](#)3. (S) DATT met on August 16 with Brigadier General (BG) Falah Audah, Director of Operations, and BG Mohammad Suleiman al-Raud, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, to discuss the performance of the Jordanian military contingent in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Audah and al-Raud readily acknowledged that leadership failures had contributed to the substandard performance of the Jordanian battalion in Haiti. They then identified several key areas of improved training that are being implemented to ensure that the new unit sent to Haiti, and all subsequent units, are better prepared to conduct operations. These include:

- Emphasis on Peace Enforcement Operations vs. Peace Keeping Operations. This will allow JAF to elevate its operations capabilities to higher threat missions covered under UN Chapter 7. Most of JAF's previous experience has been in lower threat Chapter 6 missions.

- Remedial training for all weapons crews.

- Training in hostile checkpoint procedures.

- Training in conduct of operations in urban areas (MOUT), conducted by Jordanian Special Operations Forces troops.

- Search and Rescue.

- Rules of Engagement.

- Improvised Explosive Device identification.

- Marksmanship.

- Patrolling.

[1](#)4. (S) According to Audah and al-Raud, JAF had been asked to provide a colonel to join the UN staff in Haiti, to act as a sector commander. Instead, JAF is sending a brigadier general, Mahmud Adjaji, who will have the added responsibility of commanding the Jordanian units. JAF's General Headquarters (GHQ) is also establishing a Directorate level, BG-led organization within GHQ to oversee several facets of JAF's missions - peacekeeping, making preparations, training, and deployments. King Abdullah has approved this organizational change.

[1](#)5. (S) To enhance the capabilities of Jordan's Haiti battalion, GHQ plans to send three or four UH-1 Huey helicopters with the next rotation of troops. JAF officers believe this will help them to identify, anticipate, and interdict gang and criminal activities. The next Jordanian battalion is currently in training. Unlike its predecessors, this group of soldiers is training away from their home-stations, so as to minimize distractions from their families.

[1](#)6. (S) GHQ has also changed the method of forming peace-keeping operations (PKO) units. Previously, individuals were pulled from different units to form a composite PKO unit. Now GHQ has directed each division to form one company, train them in PKO responsibilities, and provide this unit for future PKO missions. The hope is that this change will instill more chain of command discipline in the units.

[1](#)7. (S) Action Request. DATT informed the Jordanian officers that their suggestions were important first steps, but ones which needed to be executed immediately and reflected in improved performance in the field. Post suggests that the UN provide another assessment of JAF's PKO performance in one month, to determine whether further intervention is necessary.

HALE